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Rhum6 - Les effehde cODtexte prochdts par la moblllt6 'octale sur Ie vote daDs 16paya
occidentauz: 1956-1990. L'aliteur teste plusleurs hypothl!ses sur les effets de contexte prodults par
la mobl1lte soclale sur Ie vote de membres de classes Jntergenc:rationnellement stables. ees hypotheses
coneement les effets de n1veau des entrees et des sorties d'une classesodaIe s~ejfiee (pour tin pa)75 et
une annee donnesl. Ces hypotheses sont testees par une anaJysemlilti-ruveau concernant des donnees
SUi" 20.169 repondants Issus de 113 enquetes faltes dans 16 pays democratlques Jndustrlallses pendant
Is perlode 1956-1990. En deplt de ees-efforts.les analyses montrentaucun effet de contexte sjgnJftcatif.
solt au n1veau des entrees. solt au rUveau des sorties lritergeneratloDllellesde fUobl11te soclale dans un
pays, slir Ie comportement devote des personneslntergeneratlonne11ement immobJles. Dans la
discussion, l'auteur presente des explications possibles pour ces resultats negaUfs. Aaa1Jae multi-
niveau, Comportement de vote, Mobillte loeWe, Effets de contezte.
Abstract. The author tes~ several hypotheses about the contextual effects of class mobllJty on the
voting: behaviour of Intergeneratlonally stable class members. These hypotheses pertain to the effects of
levels of outflow from and Inflow mobilUy to a specific social class (In a certain nation and a specific
year!. The hypotheses are tested by mulU-Ievel modelling, and analyzing data on 20.619 respondents
from 113 surveys held in siXteen industrialized democratic countries in the peTtod 1956-1990. Despite
these efforts, the analyses show no slgnlfteant contextual effect of either the level of intergeneratlonaJ
Inflow or the level ofouUlow social mobJlity in a country on thevoung behaviour of IntergeneratJonally
Immobile persons. In the. dlscunlon sectlon possible explanations for these negaUve results are
discussed. Multilevel AnllJ-e, Votlng Beba'riour. Social MobWty, Contezt £fleets.
INTRODUCTION
In ahnost all democracies. socio-economic class Is a prime
detenninant of voting behaviour. Persons in the lower classes have a
higher chance of voting for a left-wing political party than persons in
the higher classes (Alford 1963; Heath et al 1985. 1995:
Nieuwbeeria 1996).
However, to understand fully the relationship between class position
and voting behaviour one has to take into account that socio-
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economic classes in the advanced industrial societies are far from
homogeneous and static. In all Western countries people move up
and down the social ladder with respect to their father. Occupational
groupings or class in modem society. therefore, may be envisaged as
comprising two different elements: one a more or less pennanent
"core", I.e. the intergeneratlonal immobile, the other made up of
mobile individuals of relatively recent membership, l.e, the
intergenerationally mobile - those who climbed up or down the
social ladder with regard to their parents. Processes of social
mobility, therefore, may help to explaJn "class-deviant" behaviour
within a country (Abramson. 1972) or, since patterns of absolute
intergenerational class mobility differ between countries and periods
(Erikson & Coldthorpe 1992), to explain cross-national or over-time
variations in levels of class voting (De Craaf & Ultee 1990;
Nieuwbeerta 1995),
When examining the relationship between intergenerattonal class
mobility and individual voting behaviour, most researchers have
adopted the micro-sociological perspective, I.e. they have
investigated the effects of individual mobl11ty on the voting behaviour
of intergenerationally moblle persons (see for example: Barber 1970:
Weakliem 1992: Nieuwbeerta & De Craaf 1993; De Craaf et a1.
1995), A series of studies stretching from the flrst to the third
gerteratton of research on stratification and politics (Nieuwbeerta
1995), however. suggests that Intergenerational class mobility may
also Influence people's voting behaviour In a more Indirect way. Le.
people may change their voting behaviour because they perceive
intergenerational class mobility in their environment (Lipset 1960:
Blau & Duncan 1967; Abramson & Books 1971: Thorburn 1979:
Coldthorpe 1986). It are these "contextual effects" of class mobility
that we focus on in this paper.
Although, of course, such contextual effects can be assumed to
affect the voting behaviour of both the intergenerationally mobile
and the immobile. we restrict our investigations to the immobile
class members. We do this, because for the immobile the contextual
effects can be expected to be stronger than for the mobile, The
contexts of moblle have changed over their life course and
consequently they were subject to conflicting contextual effects.
However. for immobile class members contextual effect are easier to
detect. In this paper we thus address the question: What are the
contextual effects oj intergenerational class mobiltty in a country on
the voting behaviour oJinterge112ratiortally immobile perso11S?
Addressing this questions. we build on hypotheses and results of
many earlier studies. but aim to make progress in various ways_ So
far, many scholars have formulated theories and hypotheses about
the effects of social mobility in people's context on their political
43
p. 44 - Bulletin de MitlwdOlogie SociologiquB (59 roe Pouchel, F 75017 Paris), June 1996. N. 51
preferences (for example: Thorburn. 1979; Abramson & Books
1971). but only few empirical research has been done to test
whether such effects of contextual social mobility could be detected.
Furthermore. the research on this topic that has been done. deals
with only a small number of contexts and inadequate techniques
(e.g. Thorburn 1979). In this paper we aim. to make progress by
~alyzing a dataset containing information of individuals in many
different contexts. i.e.. in seven distinguished social classes in
sixteen countries and several years over the pertod 1956-1990.
Furthermore. we use multi"level models which are especially
designed to investigate contextual effects.
HYPOTHESES
Many scholars of the vatious generations of research on
stratification and politics have formulated theortes and hypotheses
about the contextual effects of class mobility on voting behaviour
(for example: Blau & Duncan 1967: 440: Abramson & Books 1971;
Thorburn 1979; De Graaf & UItee 1987). Building on this earlier
research into the contextual effects of class mobility. we formulate
hypotheses about the effects of two charactertstics of mobility
patterns on the voting behaviour of immobile class members. These
charactertstics are the level of ouljlow mobility from a specific class
and the level of inflow mobility to a specific class.
To hypothesize on the effects of levels of outflow and inflow mobility
in a certain class on the voting behaviour of the members of that
class. we use the instrumental and expressive theortes of individual
voting behaviour (see also: Heath et al. 1985: 9; De Graaf et al.
1995: .999). According to the instrumental theory. voting behaviour
IS rational and self-interested: people vote according to their
interests and therefore vote for the party whose policies will brtng
them the greatest utility now or in the future. In the expressive
theory. voting is seen as a social act rather than an instrumental
one. People associate with each other. and these associations are
thought to provide an arena in which voting behaviour may be
influenced. In general. such associations are made with people from
the same class position. but sometimes - for example due to class
mobility - they are not.
An hypothesis concerning the effects of the level of inflow mobility to
a class on the voting behaviour of the stable members of that class.
can best be deduced from the expressive theory. Because people in
general aSSociate With people occupying the same class position
(Goldthorpe 1986). people's alignments to a certain party are usually
stimulated by the influences of their class co-members. and all
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influences· being, in the same direction. However; when classes are
heterogeneous - due to the inflow of intergenerationally mobile
people - we would expect the existing mobile class members to be
influenced by the different voting behaviour of those entertng the
class. This is especially the case when the influx of newcomers with
different political attitudes and behaviours is large (see also Lipset
1960,"
The impact of newcomers may be expected to depend not only on
the amount of inflow to a class. but also on the polltical character of
that inflow. The more left-wing the voting behaviour of newly anived
class members. the more Will the voting behaviour of the stable class
members be left-wing. Thus. the effects of inflow mobility on the
voting behaviour of immobile class members can be assumed to be
dependent on two factors: the absolute level of inflow mobility to a
class. and the polltical character of this inflow. Therefore. the
following inflow mobility hypothesis can be formulated: The higher
the level of left-wing inflow mobility to a class. the more likely it IS
that the immobile members of that class Will vote for a left-Wing
polltical party.
The effects of the level oj ouljlow mobility from a cIass on the
individual voting behaviour of immobile members of that class. can
be deduced from the Instrumental theory. We might expect that
people are influenced by seeing others move out of their class. [f
people see many co-class members leaving their class. they can be
expected to anticipate the possibility of mobility for themselves.
Consequently. they might adjust their voting behaviour m line Wlth
possible future interests. It is through this mechanism that the level
of outflow mobility from a class can be expected to have an effect on
the voting behaviour of immobile members of that class.
Again. it should be noted that the effects of outflow mobliity on the
voting behaviour of immobile class members depend. upon two
factors. The ftrst is the absolute level of outflow mobilIty. i.e. the
percentage of class members leaving the class of their father. The
higher the amount of outflow mobillty from a class. the greater the
likelihood that immobile cIass members will change their voting
behaviour. The second factor. the polltical character of the outflow
mobility - i.e. the Interests and typical voting behaviour of the
classes where the mobile flow to - can also be assumed to have an
impact on the voting behaviour of those who are "left behind". The
more left-wing the Interests of those moving out become. the more
those who stay In their class Will anticipate these new mterests and
consequently vote in a more left-wing way. Summartzing these
arguments leads us to the following outflow mobility hypothesis: The
higher the level of left-wing ouljlow mobility from a class, the more
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likely it is that the immobile members of that class will vote for a left.
wing political party.
The implications of this hypothesis can best be illustrated by an
example. For tnstance. immobile unskilled manual workers tn a
society with a high level of outflow from their class. might anticipate
. therr own possible mobility. Because, by deftnition, those movtng out
go to classes with less left"wtng tnterests, the immobile unskilled
manual workers may adopt a less left-wtng political party preference
than they would have adopted tn a society with little outflow from
their class. This hypothesis is directly tn line with Blau and
Duncan's argument that "men who see little opportunity for
improvement tn their own economic status or, at least, that of their
children, hav~ greater tnducements than those anticipating
advancements m status to organize a union, to raise wages or to
vote for a party that advocates higher taxes for the wealthy" (1967:
440).
However, the effect of the amount of outflow mobl1!ty from the
unskilled manual class does not give sufficient information about
the direction and the extent to which the immobile class members
are tnfiuenced by level of outflow mobility. This depends on the
classes to which the mobile members go. For example, tn a country
where most people from the unskilled manual class go to the skilled
manual class (with its similar tnterests and voting behaviour), the
voting behaviour of the immobile members of the unskilled manual
class will hardly be affected by the level of outflow from their class.
Conversely, tn a country where most of those leavtng the unskilled
manual class go to the service class (which has less to galn from a
more egalitarian society and displays, in general, a substantially less
left-wtng voting pattern), it is l1kely that the voting behaviour of the
immobile members of the unskilled manual class will change
substantially. Similarly, for members of the other social classes it
can be hypothesized that the more they see their class members fall
down the social ladder, the more they will anticipate their own
downward mobility, and thus vote tn a more left-wtng way.
Before testing the formulated hypotheses, we should first note a
conflicting argumentation that has also been suggested tn the
literature. Goldthorpe (19S6: 342), for example, suggested such an
hypothesis on the basiS of SOCial-psycholOgical arguments. He
argued that the more men of working class origins make their way
into the service class, the more it would seem reasonable to suppose
that a large majority of those who remaln wlthtn the working class
will "have a recognition of apparent 'openness"'. Consequently,
among those who - so to speak - were "left behtnd" some degree of
discontentment or frustration might develop. Then, under the
assumption that dissatisfaction and frustration for manual class
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members lead to a more left-wtng voting behaviour, it can be
expected that those who stay behtnd vote more left-wtng than they
would have done tn a situation where only a l1mited number of
people were upwardly mobile from their class. However, Goldthorpe
himself has already suggested that such a response would not be
widespread due to the fact that for those who fall to achieve upward
mobility, there still remaln many alternatives that can serve to
prevent any widespread sense of grievance. When testing our
hypotheses this argumentation has to be kept tn mtnd.
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS
While questions at the tndivldual-Ievel tn principle can be addressed
ustng a stngle dataset from a stngle country and year, tn the case of
contextual questions, the higher the number of contexts the better.
For this reason, we employ a data me containing individual-level
data from s1Xteen OEeD countries, seven classes and many years
over the period 1956-1990. The countries involved are: Australia.
Austria, Belgium, Britaln, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy. the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States. Because of our research
questions, we restrict the analyses to tntergenerationally immobile
male members of the classes aged eighteen years or older, leavtng us
with a total of 20,619 respondents. By analyzing data on so many
contexts and so many tndlvlduals we aim to give hypotheses on the
contextual effects of class mobility a higher chance of corroboration
in empirical tests; than has been the case in earlier studies. More
tnformation on the data me used is given tn Appendix A.
To measure respondent's class position, we utilized the seven class
version of a class scheme origtnally tntroduced by Goldthorpe for the
Oxford Mobility Inquiry (Goldthorpe et aL 1978) and later elaborated
by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarrero (1979) and EIikson and
Goldthorpe (1992). In thiS scheme, for brevity's sake called EGP
class scheme, tndivlduals are categorized tnto a class based on therr
sector, self-employment status, and supervisory status. The EGP
class scheme has been useful in comparative studies of
intergenerational class mobility (Ganzeboom et aL 1989; Erikson &
Goldthorpe 1992), and tn studies examtntng the relationship
between social class and voting behaviour (Heath et aL 1985, Evans
et aL 1991; Nieuwbeerta 1995). Furthermore, this scheme is applied
tn analyses of the effects of tndivldual class mobility on voting
behaviour in stngle countries (Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1993;
Clifford & Heath 19931 as well as tn tnternational comparative
studies (De Graaf et aL 1995: Nieuwbeerta 1995).
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The seven class version of the EGP class scheme distinguishes
between the class categones gtven in Table I. Respondents were
coded into the EGP classes on the basis of data on their occupation
self-employment and supervlsOIY status. Two steps were involved'
First, ~e original occupation codes were recoded into th~
International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) codes
(ILa 1969). Second, these ISCO codes were translated into EGP-
scores through the Ganzeboom. LUijkx and Treiman (1989) recoding
scheme.
To measure voting behaviour of class members. It would be
preferable to have data on the actual voting behaviour of
respondents dUling specific elections in the surveys, However
because vot~g is confidential in democratic countries, we have t~
rely on indIrect measures of voting behaviour. In the surveys
employed vanous such indirect measures are used as indicators for
respondent's voting behaviour. In some surveys respondents were
ask~d to name the political party they would vote for if there were a
national election tomorrow. In other surveys respondents were
asked to name the party they voted for at the most recent national
election. In yet others respondents were asked which political party
they preferred or identified with. The limitations introduced by such
dliferent measures of voting behaviour must be fully appreciated.
However, ,~anous analyses using only surveys containing "voting
beha,:o~r "measures, and several analyses using only surveys
containll1g political preference" measures. did not result in different
outcomes. Thus, we are confident that using these different
measures of voting behaviour in the analyses does not cause major
problems.. Indeed, we know of no study showing that the
relationshIp between class and political preference is fundamentally
different from that between class and respondent's voting behaviour.
In order to produce a classification of parties voted for that would
allow cross-country compaIison, we followed Bartolini & Mair (1990)
and Franklin and his colleagues (1992), and dichotomized the
political parties into left-wing on the one Side and nght-wing on the
other. In deciding whether a specific party should be included in the
left-wing block, we followed the cntena gtven by Bartolini & Mai
(1990: 42-43). and defined "all those socialist parties which ar;
members of the Socialist International and of all those communist
parties whi~~ were once members of the Communisi Third
International as left-wing parties. Since according to these cnteria
hardly any left-wing voters would exist in the United States, for that
country an exception to the cntena was made, and the Democratic
party was dermed as left-wing party.
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MODELLING CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS OF CLASS MOBILITY
The main thrust of our contextual hypotheses is that the voting
behaviour of individual stable members of a particular class in a
certain country for a given year, can be explained by the inflow and
outflow mobility in that class, country and year. Therefore, when
testing the hypotheses we have to take account of the layered
structure of our data, i.e. individuals are surveyed within years and
within classes and countIies. An appropnate way to test our
hypotheses is to use a multi-level model containing three dliferent
levels: (I) an individual-level: (2) a year-level and (3) a
class!country-level.
When modelling these effects two remarks are in order. First, the
effects of inflow and outflow mobility depend both on the amount of
inflow and outflow mobility and on the political character of that
inflow and outflow. However, the amount of inflow and outflow
mobility per se, do not give an indication of the direction in which
the tmmobile class members will change their voting behaviour, 1.e.
whether they will become more light-wing or more left-wing.
Therefore, in our models we take this into account by including
interaction effects of the level of inflow and outfl9w'mobility and the
political character of that inflow and outflow.
A second consideration when testing the contextual effects of class
mobility on the individual voting behaviour of intergenerationally
immobile class members, is that their voting behaviour is not solelY
affected by differences in rates of inflow and outflow mobility, but
are more determined by their matenal circumstances and interests.
We take this into account in our modelling by allowing each class
within each nation to have its own "natural'" level of left-wing
preferences. In this way we can test whether rates of outflow and
inflow mobility can account for vaIiations around this natural level.
Therefore, to test the hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of
inflow and outflow mobility in a society on individual voting
behaviour we use multi-level models that take these considerations
into account. We use three models: one that tests the inflow mobility
hypothesis, one that tests the outflow mobility hypotheSiS, and one
that tests both these hypotheses stmultaneously. In all three
models, at the individual-level we estimate the voting behaviour of
individual immobile class members as follows:
log(( O*LeftidJk)!(I- O*Lef4dJk)) = J>OdJk + YidJk
(I)
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the weight factors that take Into account the political character of
the outflow mobility to and Inflow mobility from a class In a country.
In all three models. the combined explanatory vartables are centred
around therr grand mean In each class and each nation. Therefore.
130 Ok represents .the natural left-wing voting behaviour In the
d&erent classes In each country. To aIlow this natural level to vary
from class to class and from nation to nation. J3 0dOk 1s treated as
random at the class/country-level:
In this individual-level equation. the dependent vartable Is the log-
odds for the unmoblle members (i) of each class (d) to vote for a left-
wmg political party rather than a rtght-wlng party In each year OJ
and country (k). The Intercept In the individual-level equation 13
represents the mean log-odds of voting left-wing rather rtght.:~g
for stable dass members In each of the distinguished classes and
countrtes m each year. This Intercept (which can vary from year to
year, from cla~s. to class, and from nation to nation), serves as the
dependent vanable In the year-level equation.
To te~t the Inflow mobility hypothesis we then use a model (Model A)
In whlCh the year-level equation is specified as follows:
130dOk =130000 + UOdOk (5)
130djk = 13odok + 13 1000 (InfloWdjk'In-welghtdk) + YOdjk
(2)
Siroilarly. to test the outllow mobility hypothesis we apply a model
(Model B) with the follOwing year-level equation:
130djk = 130dOk + .132000 (OutlloWdjk'Out-welghtcnJ + YOdjk
(3)
In addition. to test the Inflow and outllow hypotheses
slroultaneously. a third model (Model C) will be applied. whereby the
year-level equation reads as follows:
130djk = 13odOk +131000 (Inflowdjk'ln-weightctk) +
.132000 (OutlloWdjk'Out-welghtdk) + YOdjk
(4)
In these equations the variable InfloWdjk represents the proportion of
class d in year j and country k who were Intergeneratlonally mobile
(that Is. who came from non-d ortgins). The vartable Outllowd k
represents the proportion of class d In year j and Country k w~o
were IntergenerationaIIy mobile (that Is. who went to non-d
destinations). The vartables In-weightdk and Out-weightdk stand for
50
To calculate the political character of the Inflow and outflow
mobility. In-weightctk and Out-welghtctk. we use the average voting
behaviour of the stable members of the origin cIassesin our dataset
(cf. De Graaf et aL 1995). These weights must be kept constant over-
tlroe. since allowing them to vary each year could Introduce
crrculartty Into the model. This is because In some years. quite
independent of levels of mobility. there may be across-the-board
Increases In left-wing voting behaviour affecting the mobile and the
stable alike. Weights which were aIlowed to vary each year might
thus be correlated with the yearly vartatlons In the dependent
vartable.
A numerical example may make clearer the procedure for
calculating the political character of the Inflow and outllow mobility.
In calculating the political character of the Inflow mobility to the
service class in BrttaIn In 1964. we first take the actual proportions
of the service class In BrttaIn In 1964 who moved from the other six
classes. Of these. 20 per cent ortginated In the unskilled manual
class. This figure is then weighted by 0.61 (the proportion of the
stable members of the unskilled manual class who had a left-wing
voting behaviour In BrttaIn In the combined Brttish dataset).
Siroilarly. the 4 per cent who were mobile from the agrtcultural
worker class Is weighted by 0.41. The weighted Inflow to the service
class In Brttaln In 1964 thus becomes (20'61 + 28'61 + 4'41 + 7'33
+ II'1I + 4'8)/100. or 34.8. The calculation of the left-wing Inflow
mobility for other classes and countrtes proceeds in an analogous
marmer. In calculating the left-wing outllow mobility we follow the
same procedure. except that here we weight by the proportion and
the voting behaviour of the destination classes.
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RESULTS: TESTS OF CONTEXTUAL HYPOTHESES
We now test the fonnulated contextual hyPotheses. The first
hypotheSis. the outflow mobility hypothesis states that the more
"left-wing outflow" from a class there is. the more likely it Is that
stable members of that class will vote for a left-wing political party.
The second hypothesis. the inflow mobility hypothesis. implies that
the more left-wing inflow mobility to a class there is. the more likely
It Is that stable members of that class will vote left-wing.
We test these hypotheses In four different ways. To begin wtthwe
test the hypotheses for all classes simultaneously. Next. we test
them for each class separately. Subsequently we test the hypotheses
focusing on the effects of "pure" inflow and outflow mobility. l.e. not
controlling for the political character of the inflow and the outflow
mobility. Fourth. we test the hypotheses examining the effects of
"extreme" inflow and outflow mobility on the voting behaviour of the
immobile members of two classes that have very distinct Interests.
the unskilled manual.class and the service class.
Tests: All Classes Simultaneously
To test the hypotheses for all classes simultaneously. the three
multi-level models are fitted on 20.619 respondents wtthln 599
years wtthln 107 country/class combinations. Model A tests the
Inflow mobility hypothesis. by including the Interaction effect
Inflow*In-welght as a contextual explanatory variable. The outflow
mobility hypothesis is tested by fitting Model B. which Includes the
Interaction effect Outflow*Out-weight. In Model C the Inflow*In-
weight and the Outflow*Out-welght variables are Included
simultaneously. When the hypotheses hold. we expect the parameter
estimates for these variables to be positive and significantly different
from zero. The parameter estimates for the three fitted multi-level
models are presented In Table 2.
The estimates of the parameters In the multi-level analysis In
Models A and C. indicating the effect of left-wing inflow mobility are
0.004 and 0.005 respectively. These estlmates are In the expected
direction but clearly not statistically significant. We therefore can
not accept the hypotheSis that the more left-wing inflow mobility
there is to a class. the more likely it Is that immobile members wtll
have a left-wing voting behaviour.
In Models B and C estlmates of the effects of left-wing outflow
mObility take the values -0.001 and -0.002 respectively. These are
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not In the expected direction, but are also not statistically
significant. Therefore. we can not accept the outflow mobility
hypothesis that the more left-wing outflow mohllity there Is from a
class. the more likely it is that immobile members of that class will
have a left-wing voting behaviour.
Tests: Per Clasa
It might be. however. that while we must reject the inflow and
outflow hypotheses for all classes simultaneously. they nev:rtheless
hold for stable members of some particular classes. For th,S reason
we fit our models for the stable members of each specific class
separately. To test our hypotheses for each class separately. multi-
level models are fitted. each analyzing only those respondents who
currently are members of a specific class. As in th~ test. for all
classes simultaneously, we fit three model~: Model A mcludmg the
interaction effect Inflow*In-weight. Model B mcludlng the mteraction
effect Outflow*Out-weight. and Model C Including both these
variables. Again. if the hypotheses hold. significant posltive
parameter estimates are to be expected. In Table 3 only the
pertinent parameter estlmates of the fitted multi-level models are
presented. All the other coefficients - the intercept and the random
coefficients - are not reported.
The results of these tests are largely negative. The figures In Table 3
. dlcate that none of the estlmated parameters are statistically
::;-gnificant. Furthennore. ten out of the twenty-eight estimated
parameters have a negative value. l.e. these effects are ill the
unexpected direction. This means that even when testing the
hypotheses for all classes separately. both the Inflow and outflow
hypotheses have to be rejected.
Tests: Effects of "Pure" Inflow and Outflow Mobility
Before drawing conclusions wtth respect to the Inflow and outflow
hypotheses. an extra test Is In order. It might be argued that the
inclusion of Interaction effects between the amount of Inflow and
outflow mobility and the political character of that mobility obscures
the main effect of the level of inflow and outflow mobility. Therefore.
as a check we do our analyses including only the pure mobility level
variables In models A. B and C. This results In models D. E and F.
where the In-weight and Out-weight variables are left out.
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When making predictions about the effect of the pure levels of inflow
and outflow on the voting behaviour of immobile members of specific
classes. assumptions must be made about the political character of
that Inflow and outflow. For some clallses it Is easy to come up with
predictions. because the assumptions are straightforward. For
example. It can be all$umed that all people who move out of the
skilled and unskilled manuai classes go to classes with more rlght-
wing interests and political culture than are found among the stable
members of the manual classes. Thus. for members of the unskilled
and skilled manual classes. It can be expected that the more outflow
from their class there Is. the more right-wing they will be.
Furthermore. It can be assumed that those who move into the
manual classes also have more right-wing voting behaviour than the
stable members of these classes. Therefore. it can be expected that
the more inflow mobility there is to the manual classes, the less
likely the immobile members of these classes will be to vote for a
left-wing party.
In addition. for members of the farming and petty bourgeoisie
classes it can be assumed that most outflow goes to more left-wing
classes, while most inflow comes from more left-wing classes. In this
way It can be predicted that the more Inflow mobility to these
classes, tile more likely members of these classes are to vote left-
wing. For the other classes - the service class. the routine nOIl-
manual class and the agricultural labourers - making predictions
about the effects of the amount of Inflow and outflow mobility is less
straightforward. The political character of that mobility depends too
much on the patterns of intergeneratlonal mobility in a cduntry in a
certain year to be able to predict the contextual effects of Inflow and
outflow mobility for these classes.
To test our predictions about the effects of pure inflow and outflow
mobHity on the voting behaviour of stable class members. we follow
the same procedure as before. For each class separately, three
multi-level models are fitted. each analyzing only those respondents
who are members of a specific class. Model D includes the Inflow
variable. model E the Outflow variable. and model F includes both
these variables. In Table 4 the pertinent parameter estimates are
presented. Again the results of these tests are negative. None of the
estimated parameters representing the effects df levels of Inflow and
outflow differ significantly from zero. Thus. in none of our analyses
so far. did we find a single indication of a contextual effect of Inflow
and outflow mobility in a country on the voting behaviour of
immobile class members. This gives us strong grounds on which to
reject both hypotheses outright.
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Tests: Effects of "Eztreme" Inflow and Outflow Mobility
Although the results presented above seem convincing. we would
Ilke to perform one further analysis. When the scholars of the first
generation hinted at the extstence of contextual effects of class
mobility. they had no detailed class scheme available or even in
mind. Their claims about the existence of contextual effects referred
mainly to simple Ideas of Inflow and outflow mobility from the
highest to the lowest classes (see for example: Abramson & Books
1971. and Parkin 1971) To do justice to these claims. we therefore
do a last test where we focus ontbe effects of inflow and outflow
mobility on the voting behaviour of members of two classes that are
"extreme" with respect to their interests. the service class and the
unskilled manual class. We carry out separate analyses for both of
these classes. and focus on the effects of inflow and outflow mobility
from one of these classes to the other. Of course, the idea behind
these analyses is that. if contextual effects do exist. these can be
expected to be detected most easily when investigating the effects of
this "extreme" Inflow and outflow mobility.
On the basis of our above formulated hypotheses and earlier studies
on this topic. we can expect the level of inflow mobility from the
unskilled manual class into the service class to have a significant
effect on the voting behaviour of Immobile class members of the
service class. The more former members of the unskilled manual
class enter the service class. the more the stable members of the
service class will be Influenced by them. and consequently the more
they will vote for a left-wing rather than a right-wing political party.
Similarly. we expect the level of Inflow mobility from tl,e service class
into the unskilled manual class to have a substantial Impact on the
voting behaviour of the stable members of the unskilled manual
class. The more service class members move into the manual class,
the more the members of that manual class can be expected to vote
for a right-wing party.
In addition, we can fannulate hypotheses concerning the effects of
levels of outflow mobility. If stable members of the service class see
many of their class members "fall" to the unskilled manual class. it
can be expected that the stable service class members anticipate
their own downward mobility and thus become more likely to vote
for a left-wing party. Thus. the more outflow mobility from the
service class into the unskilled manual class. the more the stable
members will vote for a left-wing party. Again. an analogous idea
can be applied to the voting behaviour of the stable members of the
unskilled manual class. In this case. It can be expected that the
more people fro~ the unskilled manual class climb to the service
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class, the more those who remain in the unskilled manual class will
anticipate their own climb, and the more they will vote rtght-wlng.
To test the hypotheses of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility. we
first do a separate analysis on data from stable members of the
service class. We use the same models and data as earlier. but as
our explanatory Inflow vartable we take of the total number of people
currently In the sernce class the percentage that arrtved Into the
service class from the unskilled manual class. Furthermore. we take
the percentage of people who moved Into the unskilled manual
class, based on the total number of people that were ortglnally
members of the service class, as the Outflow vartable, Again we fit
three models, one including as an explanatory vartable only the
Inflow vartabIe, a second only the Outflow vartable, and a third both
vartabIes. The results of fitting these models to our data, however,
show statistically insignificant parameter estimates for these
explanatory vartables. The parameter of the Inflow vartable has the
value of -0.001 [s.e. 0.014) when It Is solely Included, and 0.002 [s.e.
0.014) when it Is simultaneously Included. In addition, the Outflow
parameters yield the value "0.012 (s.e. 0.019) and -0.013 (s.e.
0,020), respectively.
A separate analysis, using the same model and data, but now
concerning the voting behaviour of the stable members of the
unskilled manual class also yields statistically Insignificant
parameter estimates. As our Inflow vartable we take the percentage
of the total number of people currently in the skllied manual class,
that arrived into the skilled manual class from the service class. As
our Outflow vartable we take the percentage of people who moved
into the service class, based on the total number of people who were
ortglnally members of the unskilled manual class, The parameter
estimate of the Inflow variable has the value 0.002 (s.e, 0,012) when
it is solely included, and -0,002 [s.e, 0,014) when It is
simultaneously Included. The Outflow parameter estimates yield the
values - 0,003 [s.e. 0,024) and 0.011 (s.e. 0.022) respectively.
Thus. also doing these analyses on "extreme" inflow and
outflow mobility, we do not find any corroboration of the hypotheses
concerning the contextual effects of inflow and outflow class mobility
on the voting behaviour of immobile class members.
CONCLUSIONS
In studies of the fIrst until the third generation of research on
stratification and politics many scholars have suggested that
Intergenerational class mobility has contextual effects on the voting
56
Bulkttn de MithodowgU SoctologUJue (,59 rue Pouchel, F 7,5017 Paris), June 1996, N. 51 - p. 57
behaviour of stable class members. However, such arguments have
been made without the support of empirical evidence. In this paper
we used the literature to formulate two hypotheses about the
contextual effects of class mobility on the voting behaviour of
Intergenerationally immobile class members. These hypotheses
pertain to the effects of both inflow mobility and outflow mobility.
We aimed to make progress on earlier studies of research on
stratification and politics by giving the hypotheses the highest
possible chance to be corroborated. First, we tested these
hypotheses by analyzing survey data from a very large number of
contexts; Le. data of seven classes from sixteen countries over the
pertod 1956 to 1990. Second, we used multi-level models which are
espeCially designed to Investigate contextual effects. Despite these
efforts the results were negative. The analyses showed no significant
contextual effect of either the level of Intergenerational inflow or the
level of outflow class mobility In a country on the voting behaviour of
Intergenerationally immobile persons. These negative results are
remarkable when regarding the large number of studies that have
suggested the contextual effects of Intergenerational class mobility
on politics.
An explanation for the negative results might be the number of
contexts under investigation in this paper. We realize that. due to
the traditional 'small N' problem with contextual analysis, it is
difficult to find significant contextual effects, of social mobility. To
find statistically significant effects of contextual vartables, a change
of one percent In the amount of mobility has to lead to a rather large
change In the percentage of people that have a left-wing voting
behaviour. On the other hand, by analyzing data from more than
twenty-thousand Individuals In seven classes from 16 counlries
interviewed in several years, we have given the hypotheses on the
contextual effects of class mobility a significant higher chance of
corroboration in empirical tests, than has been the case in earlier
studies. Even more, from a practical point of view It is almost
Impossible to find data of Intergenerationally immobile respondents
from more counmes and years.
A more substantive explanation for the negative results might be
that there 1s a difference between perceived and actual levels of
mobility In a class. The perceived level of mobility may largely be
influenced by local examples that do not necessarily represent the
national mobility pattern. This is an important issue, since we might
expect class members' perceptions of potential mobility to have a
larger influence on their political party preferences, Another
explanation, linked to the fIrst, might be that perceived mobIlity
chances may not be based upon long range mobility, In our analyses
we only Investigate Inter-class mobility. However, people also change
In social positions within classes, for example people change In their
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income posItion. Thus. It might be that If class members think about
th~ir chances of becoming upwardly or downwardly mobile, they
think more in terms of intra-class mobility than inter-class mobility.
If th,s 's the case, even our detailed EGP class Is stili to crude,
because It does not allow us to pick up the contextual effects of
intra-class income mobility. Concluding, a rephrasing of the
hypotheses in terms of the contextual effects of local short-range
mobility on individual voting behaViour, seems worthwhile,
The negative results in this paper have consequences for
understanding the political consequences of mobility On the political
constellation in a country. In earlier studies. it has been customary-
to concentrate on the mobile and to suppose that more (upward)
mobility in a country leads to a lower level of class voting in that
country. Such arguments generally assume composition effects. For
example, If more people with manual backgrounds enter the service
class, its mean voting behaviour will be more left-wing. However,
also contextual effects of social mobility are generally assumed to
strengthen a shift to less class voting. For instance, the Influences of
the mobile members on the immobile were assumed to cause a
movement towards the left by immobile members of the non-manual
classes. and towards the right by immobile members of the manual
classes. However, this paper's findings do not support these
assumptions, and imply that contextual effects of class mobility are
unlikely to be responsible for variations in levels of class voting
across countries and periods.
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Social class scheme: EGP categories
Parameter estimates of multi-level models: the effects of inflow and outflow
mobility on the left-wing voting behaviour of immobile class members
Model A Model B Model C
Routine nonmanual class III
Petly bourgeoisie IVa,b
F:mners IV,
Skilled workers V,Vl
Nonskilled workers VIla
Agricultural labourers VUb
Parameter estimates of multi-level models: the effects of levels of "pure"
inflow and outflow mobility on the left-wing voting behaviour of immobile
class members per class
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Model A Model B Model C
Pnrumeter s.c. P:tromelcr s.c. Pnrumetcr s.c.
Sef\,i(·f ,",".f.! IN = ~910)
inflov.' • in-weig!ht 0.017 0.021 0.0l7 0.021
outflow 'ont-weig!ht -0.006 0.020 ·0.007 0.020
R"utillf·ml/llllllnuul (N = 91J)
inflow ¥ in-weighl 0.0.:\3 0.021 0,033 0,023
outflow' out,weight 0.015 0.026 -0.000 0.028
Puty hllurRc"i..ie IN = 1062)
inflow' in-weight -0.028 0.DI8 ·0.029 0.019
outflow ¥ out-wcighl -0,007 0.026 0.003 0.027
Fllrmi?,.. (N = 3098)
inflow .c in.wcighl 0.017 0.019 0.018 0019
oUlflow • OUI-wcight 0,010 0.021 0012 0,020
Skilled lII(/1w'll (N = 6144)
inflow' in,wcight 0.010 0.016 O.OOS 0017
outflow' oUI·wcight 0.0!4 0.Q2! 0,012 0,022
UII.<killed 1I1<1nuIII IN = 3099)
innow C in-weight 0,003 0.015 0.011 n,016
outflow' oUI-weighl ·O.OJ~ 0.010 -0.0.19 D.O::!l
Agriwl/llmll"bu'uer" (N : 393)
inflow' in-weighl ;Om7 0.020 0.022 0.020
oUlflow • out-weight 0.022 0.029 oml n,ll:\{)
Table 3. Parameter estimates of multi~level models: effects of inflow' and outflow
mobility on left-wing voting behaviour of immobile class members, per
class
Table 4.
t
.~
I
1
j
\
1
s.c.ParameterParameter s.e
Description
Semi- and unskilled, nonagricultural manual workers,
Agricultural and other workers in primary production.
Routine nonmanual employees in administration and commerce;
sales personnel; other rank-and~fiIe service workers.
Small proprietors and' artisans, with and without employees.
Farmers, smallholders and other self-employed workers in pri-
mary production.
Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers;
skilled manual workers.
Large proprietors; professionals, administrators and managers;
higher-grade technicians; supervisors of nonmanual workers.
I.II
Code
Parameter s.c.
Fixed effects
Title
Service class
Table I.
Table 2.
62
COllnfrvlclass level
Intercept 0.902 0.143 0.902 0.143 0.902 0.143
Note; Ihe analyses were based on 20,619 IndlVlduals WIthin 599 years within 101 country/classes
Indil'idual level
Intercept
Year level
inflow'" in-weight
0utl1ow '" out-weight
Y<lriance components
Individual level
Inlercept
Year level
Intercept
-0.458
0.004
0.093
0.100
0.006
0,015
-0.457
-.001
0.094
0.100
0.007
0.015
-0,458
0:005
·0.002
0.093
0.100
0.006
0,007
0.015
Model D Modcl E Mood F
Parameter s.c. P:uwneicr ,., P~r:lmeICr
"
S"'ril"fdms (N: .~910)
iunow O.oJS 0.011 0,019 0,012
nUlflow -0.004 0.010 ,0.007 O,Dln
R"lI/llle IJ",,,nlJnu,,/ {N = 91,1}
inflow 0.008 0.013 0.010 O.D2.~
<lutllow 0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.016
,I Pm)' bl/flrl:~"i.lic (N : 10621
\ inl10w -0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010
I OUlnOW 0.004 0.013 ·0.001 0.014
farmer.1 (N: 3098)
I inflow 0.009 0.009 O.OOS 0.009
I
oUlnow 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.01!
Skilled IIIllIluul (N=61441
inflow 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.010
<lutflow ·0,008 0.008 -0.009 0,008
Undilled munuul (N = 3099)
lnnow "().OOI 0.008 O.{)()!i 0009
olllflow ·0,009 0.009 ·0.012 0.011
Awi(·ulliml! 1,I/murers(N = 393)
innow 0.003 0.006 0.003 0,008
outflow 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.023
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